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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah,
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and
Rules 3(a) and 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for reviews:
1.

Did the district court error in holding that T. Lamar

and Aletha Dewsnups1 (the "Dewsnups") counterclaim was
"implicitly" disposed of by the summary judgment on the
plaintiffsf claim.
2.

Did the district court error in denying the Dewsnups1

motion to either reconsider and set aside the summary judgment
or to certify the summary judgment as final?
3.

Did the district court error in denying the Dewsnups1

motion to amend their counterclaim?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Issue 1 - Correctness Standard.

The first issue

appeals the district court's interpretation of the summary
judgment.

Although such an interpretation can be a "finding

of fact" where extrinsic evidence is considered in
interpreting the judgment, in this case, where the court's
interpretation was based solely on the
"conclusion of law."

pleadings, it is a

Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716

(Utah 1985); c.f. Williams v. Miller, 794 P.2d 23 (Utah
App. 1990).

Therefore, the appellate court will give no

-2-

deference to the trial court's interpretation of the summary
judgment, but will review it for correctness.

Ron Case

Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).
2.

Issue 2 - Correctness Standard.

The second issue

appeals the district court"s denial of the Dewsnups' motion to
either reconsider and set aside the summary judgment or to
certify it as final.

The court based this denial on the

conclusion of law that the Dewsnups' counterclaim had been
"implicitly" disposed of by the summary judgment.

(See the

Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as Exhibit G ) .
Ordinarily, where a matter is in the discretion of the
district court, the district court's decision will not be
overturned on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion.
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1988).

This is

not true, however, where the court's decision is based on an
erroneous legal conclusion.

In such a case, the court will

not give deference to the district court's decision but will
use the correctness standard.

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe

Railway Company v. Marzuola, 418 P.2d 625, 627 (Okla. 1966);
Hornback v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 3 95 P.2d
379, 380 (Kan. 1964).

In this case, because the district

court's denial of the Dewsnups' motion was based on a legal
conclusion, the correctness standard should be used.
3.

Issue 3 - Correctness Standard.

The third issue

appeals the district court's denial of the Dewsnups' motion to
amend their counterclaim.

Again, this decision was based on

-3-

the legal conclusion that the Dewsnups1 counterclaim had been
disposed of,
Exhibit G ) .

(See Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as
Consequently, as discussed above, the appellate

court will not give deference to the district court's ruling,
but will use the correctness standard.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The Dewsnups have suffered for 10 years for a debt which
they did not owe.

This is the first time that the Dewsnups

will have their story heard.

In 1978, the Dewsnups1 attorney

loaned the Dewsnups money secured by a trust deed on their
farm.

After they had paid the debt in full in 1980, their

attorney refused to release the trust deed and sued them on
the trust deed for a debt which they did not owe and which was
not secured by the trust deed.

Their attorney then

recommended another attorney to represent them in the
litigation, who did not make any appearance (written or
otherwise) on plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment and
summary judgment was granted against the Dewsnups.
In order to try to save their farm the Dewsnups1 filed
bankruptcy.

However, the bankruptcy court sought only to

eventually enforce a summary judgment that it presumed was
correct.

Since a state court decision is res judicate in

bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court could not reconsider
the facts underlying the summary judgment.

Sustained by the

knowledge that they had paid off the mortgage, the Dewsnups
persevered through 10 years of bankruptcy litigation,
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believing that if they persevered long enough, somehow justice
would prevail and they would get their farm back.
Unfortunately, in the bankruptcy court litigation, all of the
issues were mere "technicalities" toward the eventual
enforcement of the summary judgment.

Even if the Dewsnups1

win their current appeal before the United States Supreme
Court in their bankruptcy case, they will lose their farm.
During the last 10 years the Dewsnups have not been able
to farm their farm (on the advice of their bankruptcy
counsel), have been reduced to poverty and have suffered
enormously emotionally and physically.

It is difficult to

describe the emotional toll 10 years of bankruptcy
litigation has had on this family, as they have tried to save
the family farm.

Many attribute LeMar Dewsnupfs premature

death in 1986 to the ongoing stress of this litigation.

As a

result of borrowing money to pay the ever mounting legal fees,
two of the Dewsnup children were eventually unable to repay
the money they had borrowed and were also forced into
bankruptcy.

Alone and penniless in 1988, and having lost

below in the bankruptcy and district courts, Aletha Dewsnup
went through the town of Delta, Utah with a tin cup raising
the $10,000 bond she needed to appeal to the Tenth Circuit.
Sustained by the belief that if she tried hard enough, someday
justice would prevail, Aletha Dewsnup never gave up hope.
Aletha Dewsnup has tried hard enough, the Dewsnups never owed
the debt for which they have been persecuted for 10 years,

-5-

and now is the time for justice to prevail.
After the plaintiffs had filed their complaint against
the Dewsnups, the Dewsnups filed a counterclaim against the
plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on

their claim and summary judgment was granted, but the
Dewsnups1 counterclaim was never decided.
When the Dewsnups filed bankruptcy, their counterclaim
became an asset of the bankruptcy trustee and the Dewsnups
were not able to pursue it. On January 6, 19 91, the
bankruptcy trustee finally abandoned the counterclaim back to
the Dewsnups.
Having regained control of their counterclaim, on January
22, 1991 the Dewsnups filed a motion to amend their
counterclaim and a motion to either reconsider and set aside
the summary judgment or to certify it as final, so that it
could be appealed.

Because the summary judgment had not

disposed of all the claims in the case and had not been
certified as final, under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure the summary judgment was still subject to
revision.

The court denied both motions, holding that the

Dewsnups counterclaim had been "implicitly" disposed of by the
summary judgment.

From that holding the Dewsnups brought this

appeal.

-6-

FACTS
1.

In the spring of 1980f the Dewsnups were farmers who

owned a farm near Delta, Utah.

LaMar Dewsnup's health was not

good and the Dewsnups decided to purchase a motel as a way of
eventually getting out of farming. (R. 90).
2.

The Dewsnups approached their attorney, Joseph

Henroid, and asked him if he knew anyone that would lend them
$119,000 as a down payment on a motel they were looking at.
Joseph Henroid said that he would lend them part of the money
from the Annette Jacob trust fund that he was trustee for and
that he knew some other people that would lend them the rest.
(R. 90-91).
3.

The Dewsnups and Joseph Henroid had agreed that the

loan would be secured by 16 0 acres of farm land and certain
water rights that the Dewsnups owned outright.

(R. 62, 91,

197).
4.

In June 1980, the Dewsnups borrowed $119,000 from

Joseph Henroid, as trustee of the Annette Jacob Trust, and
from the rest of the plaintiffs in this case (who were people
that Joseph Henroid had contacted). (R. 91, 124, 199-200).
5.

Joseph Henroid and Earl Peck, one of the attorneys at

Joseph Henroid1s law firm, drafted all of the loan documents.
(R. 91, 125, 197).
6.

On or about June 1, 1978, the Dewsnups executed three

promissory notes (the "Promissory Notes") in favor of the
plaintiffs totaling $119,000.
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(R. 91, 124, 199-200).

7.

At the same time, the Dewsnups executed a Trust Deed

and an Amended Trust Deed (collectively, the "Trust Deed") to
secure the Promissory Notes.
8.

(R. 91, 124, 199-200).

Although the Dewsnups signed the Trust Deed assuming

that it reflected their agreement with Joseph Henroid, it did
not.

Unbeknowst to the Dewsnups, the Trust Deed also included

56.71 acres of land in Oak City, Utah that Aletha Dewsnup had
been given as an inheritance.
9.

(R. 62, 91, 198).

Also unbeknowst to the Dewsnups, as additional

security for the Promissory Notes the Dewsnups executed an
Assignment of Contract (the "Assignment of Contract"),
assigning to the plaintiffs a security interest in a purchase
contract (the "Purchase Contract") by which the Dewsnups were
purchasing additional farm land. (R. 62, 91, 198).
10.

In 1976, the Dewsnups had entered into the Purchase

Contract to purchase some additional farm land (sometimes
referred to herein as the "Arrow Land") adjacent to the 160
acres the Dewsnups owned from LaMar Dewsnup1s cousin, Richard
Dewsnup (through his company—Arrow Investment Company), for
$400,000 with annual installments for twenty years due on
January 2 of each year.
11.

(R. 91-92, 125, 198-99).

Title to the land being purchased under the Purchase

Contract was held by an escrow agent under escrow
instructions.
12.

(R. 183-84).

The Purchase Contract gave the Dewsnups the right to

terminate the Purchase Contract by failing to make any of the
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annual installments due under the Purchase Contract on January
2, by the following June 2 of that year:
If Buyers default on the payment falling due on
January 2f 1977, or any payment thereafter falling
due, and if such sum or any part thereof remains
in default for a period of five months, then
Buyers shall forfeit any and all right, title and
interest that they otherwise would have in and to
the property covered by this agreement, title to
which has not passed to Buyers at that time, and
this agreement shall terminate.
(Purchase Contract, pp. 5-6). (R. 153-54).
13.

If a January 2 payment due under the Purchase

Contract was not paid by the next succeeding June 2, the
escrow agent was instructed to return title to the land to the
seller:
Your instructions are to...release to the seller the
warranty deed...if...the Buyers shall default in the
payment of any sum falling due under the agreement
and said sum or any part thereof remains in default
for a period of five months.
(Escrow Instructions, Paragraph 4).
14.

(R. 184).

At the time the Dewsnups entered into the Purchase

Contract the Intermountain Power Project ("IPP") was coming
into the area and had driven up land prices and the $400,000
purchase price reflected the inflated real estate market at
the time, which proved to be too high. (R. 92).
15.

In 1980, two years after the $119,000 loan had been

made, LaMar Dewsnup's health was getting worse, and property
values were declining.

The Dewsnups decided to let the land

they were purchasing under the Purchase Contract go back so
LaMar would have less land to farm.
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(R. 92, 125, 200).

16.

On June 2, 1980, the Dewsnups exercised their

contractual right under the Purchase Contract and terminated
the Purchase Contract by failing to make the January 2, 1980
payment by June 2, 1980.

Therefore, the Purchase Contract

terminated according to its terms, the escrow agent delivered
title to the land back to LaMar Dewsnup's cousin as provided
in the escrow instructions, and the Dewsnups voluntarily
forfeited all of their right, title and interest in the Arrow
Land. (R. 92, 125, 200-01).
17.

Five days later, on June 7, 1980 and over the

Dewsnups' objections, Joseph Henroid made the January 2, 1980
payment of $4 9,96 6.21 on the Purchase Contract, even though it
was too late.

(R. 92, 125-26, 201). (See the Demand for

Reimbursement attached hereto as Exhibit A ) .
18.

The plaintiffs demanded that the Dewsnups reimburse

them the $49,966.21 that Joseph Henroid had paid on the
Purchase Contract.
19.

(R. 92, 126, 201). (See Exhibit A ) .

The Assignment of Contract required the Dewsnups to

reimburse the plaintiffs for payments made by the plaintiffs
"under and pursuant to the Purchase Contract":
[The Dewsnups] agree that in the event they are in
default that [plaintiffs] may make the payments due
under and pursuant to [the Purchase Contract] and
will be reimbursed for the same by [the Dewsnups].
(Assignment of Contract, Paragraph 4).
20.

(R. 145).

The Dewsnups refused to do so, believing that they

were not legally required to do so since the Purchase Contract
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had terminated before Joseph Henroid had made the payments and
therefore Joseph Henorid's payments could not have been made
"under and pursuant to" the Purchase Contract.
21.

(R. 92, 126).

On June 1, 1980, the $119,000 loan came due.

(R. 8-10).
22.

On September 16, 1980, the plaintiffs filed a

complaint against the Dewsnups to foreclose on the Trust Deed
for the non-payment of the $119,000 loan.

(R. 1-7).

(A copy

of the complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit B ) .
23.

About this time, Joseph Henroid told the Dewsnups

that he could no longer be their lawyer and recommended a
lawyer in Provo.

The Dewsnups hired the lawyer he suggested,

who filed an answer and counterclaim on November 21, 1980.
(R. 59-63, 93).

(A copy of the answer and counterclaim is

attached hereto as Exhibit B ) .
24.

The counterclaim alleged that Joseph Henroid and

Earl J. Peck had breached their fiduciary duty to the Dewsnups
by failing to disclose that the Trust Deed included more than
the 160 acres agreed upon and that the Assignment of Contract
assigned the plaintiffs a security interest in the Purchase
Contract.

The counterclaim requested a reformation of the

Trust Deed and the Assignment of Contract to conform with the
representations Joseph Henroid made to the Dewsnups as to the
legal effect of those documents at the time the $119,000 loan
was made.
25.

(R. 61-63).
In December, 1980, the Dewsnups sold the motel and
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paid in full all principal and interest due and owing on the
$119,000 loan ($151,013.89) and asked that the Trust Deed be
reconveyed.
26.

(R. 93f 126, 202).

The plaintiffs refused to release the Trust Deed

unless they were reimbursed for the $4 9,966.21 payment Joseph
Henroid had made.
27.

(R. 93, 126-27, 202).

The Trust Deed only secured the Promissory Notes,

and did not secure payments made under the Assignment of
Contract:
[The] trustor conveys and warrants to trustee
in trust with power of sale, following described
property...for the purpose of securing payment
of the indebtedness evidence by a promissory note
of even date herewith, in the principal sums of
$33,000; 56,000 and 30,000, made by Trustor,
payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times,
in the manner and with interest as thereon set forth,
and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications
thereof.
(Trust Deed, p. 1). (R. 133, 138).
28.

Notwithstanding the fact that the $4 9,966.21 debt,

even if valid, was not secured by the Trust Deed, on March 3,
1981 the plaintiffs filed a motion to foreclose on the Trust
Deed, for the $4 9,966.21 payment and filed an affidavit in
support thereof.

(R. 66-70).

(Copies of the Motion for

Summary Judgment and the Affidavit of Louis L. Timm are
attached hereto as Exhibits D and E, respectively).
29.

Neither plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment nor

the affidavit filed in support thereof either mentioned the
counterclaim or any of the issues raised in the counterclaim.
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(R. 66-70).
30.

(See Exhibits C and D ) .

When the plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment was

scheduled to be heard, the Dewsnups1 new attorney failed to
appear at the hearing and summary judgment was granted against
the Dewsnups.
31.

(R. 73-74).

On April 22, 1981f Judge Harlan Burns signed the

Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (sometimes referred
to herein as the "summary judgment"). (R. 75-79)

(A copy of

the Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is attached
hereto as Exhibit F ) .
32.

The Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure did

not mention the counterclaim or any of the issues raised in
the counterclaim.
33.

(R. 75-79)

(See Exhibit F ) .

The Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure also

did not specify that it was a final judgment for purposes of
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 75-79).

(See Exhibit F ) .
34.

With the summary judgment in hand, the plaintiffs

began proceedings to foreclose on the Dewsnups1 farm to
recover the $49,966.21 payment.

Because the plaintiffs

refused to release the Trust Deed, the Dewsnups were unable to
finance the farm debts which were coming due.

The Dewsnups1

new lawyer advised them that their only hope to save the
family farm was to file for bankruptcy, which they did.

It

was not until many years later that the Dewsnups reviewed the
court records and learned that their new lawyer had never

-13-

appeared at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment.
35.

(R. 93-94).
Although the bankruptcy allowed the Dewsnups to

forestall foreclosure on their farm, upon filing bankruptcy,
their counterclaim became the property of the bankruptcy
trustee and the Dewsnups were barred from pursuing it.
(R. 95-97).
36.

As a result of summary judgment being erroneously

granted 10 years ago and plaintiffs' refusal to reconvey the
Trust Deed, the Dewsnups have suffered enormous financial,
emotional and physical losses through 10 years of bankruptcy
litigation.

Many attribute LaMar Dewsnup's premature death in

1986 to the ongoing stress of this litigation.
has been reduced to a virtual pauper.

Aletha Dewsnup

She now works odd jobs

to try to pay the enormous legal bills that have accumulated.
For nearly 10 years now, the farm has lain dormant.

The

Dewsnups have not farmed the land on the advice of their
bankruptcy counsel.
37.
end.

(R. 94, 203).

The Dewsnups1 bankruptcy case is finally nearing an

Their case is currently before the United States Supreme

Court on a bankruptcy issue and will be heard during October
term.

Even if the Dewsnups win their appeal before the United

States Supreme Court they will probably still lose their farm,
since they will have to redeem the farm for $3 9,000 which they
currently do not have.

(R. 262-282).
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38.

On December 14, 1990, the bankruptcy trustee

published a notice of intention to abandon the Dewsnups1
counterclaim and on January 6, 1991, the bankruptcy trustee
abandoned the Dewsnups1 counterclaim.
39.

(R. 103-105).

With the counterclaim abandoned, on January 22,

1991, the Dewsnups filed a motion to amend the counterclaim,
in order to proceed forward to a final adjudication of the
counterclaim.
40.

(R. 194-207),

On January 22, 1991, the Dewsnups also filed a

motion to either reconsider and set aside the Summary Judgment
and Foreclosure Decree, or to certify it as final pursuant to
Rule 54(b) so that the Dewsnups could appeal it.
(R. 107-109).
41.

On February 21, 1991, Judge Ray M. Harding denied

both motions, holding that the Summary Judgment and
Foreclosure Decree had "implicitly" disposed of the Dewsnups1
counterclaim. (R. 348-349).

(A copy of the Memorandum

Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit G ) .
42.

On March 11, 1991, Judge Ray M. Harding entered a

Order Denying Defendant Dewsnups Motion to Amend Counterclaim,
Reconsider or Certify as Final.

(R. 350-51).

(A copy thereof

is attached hereto as Exhibit H ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Dewsnups counterclaim was not disposed of by the
summary judgment because it was not mentioned in the motion
for summary judgment, in the affidavit in support of the
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motion for summary judgment or in the summary judgment itself.
Furthermore, any disposition of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim
would have been without notice to the Dewsnups and therefore
would have been in violation of due process and in violation
of Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Because the Dewsnups1 counterclaim was not disposed of,
and because the summary judgment was not certified as final at
the time it was entered, under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure the summary judgment was not a "final
judgment" and is subject to revision.

Because the summary

judgment was erroneously granted, it should be set aside. If
not set aside, it should be certified as final pursuant to
Rule 54(b) so that it can be appealed.
Finally, under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure the Dewsnups1 should have been allowed to amend
their counterclaim toward a final adjudication thereof.
ARGUMENT
I
THE DEWSNUPS1 COUNTERCLAIM HAS NOT BEEN ADJUDICATED.
A.

UNDER RULE 54(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE DEWSNUPS1 COUNTERCLAIM
WAS NOT DISPOSED OF BY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The summary judgment only granted judgment on the
plaintiffs1 complaint and never mentioned the counterclaim or
any of the issues raised in the counterclaim.

Nevertheless,

Judge Harding held that the counterclaim was "implicitly"
disposed of by the summary judgment.
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That holding is contrary to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which governs the disposition of multiple
claim cases.

Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

allows for the partial disposition of claims in a multiple
claims case.

However, Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure also requires that such claims be "expressly"
disposed of:
When more than one claim for relief is presented
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court
that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties....
Prior to the 1946 amendments to Rule 54(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provided for partial disposition of claims in
a multiple-claim case, but did not require that such a
disposition had to be "express." Rule 54(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure only provided that "[t]he judgment
shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so
disposed of and the action shall proceed on the remaining
claims."

10 C. Wright, A. Miller and M. Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure, Section 2653, at 20 (1983).
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The problem that arose was that whenever one claim in a
multiple claim case was disposed of, the claimants did not
know whether other claims had been implicitly disposed of.
Consequently, the claimants had to either appeal the judgment,
or risk losing the right of appeal if their claim had been
implicitly disposed of:
Several problems arose in interpreting the original
language of Rule 54(b) .... An order striking one
of several counts of a complaint, although it might
appear to be merely a pleading ruling, could turn
out to have been a judgment terminating the action
with respect to a separate claim. The party
adversely affected by the order was forced either
to appeal immediately and run the risk of having
it dismissed as premature or to proceed with the
action and take a chance on losing the right to
have the order reviewed because of the expiration
of the time for appeal.
10 C. Wright, A. Miller and M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure, pp. 21-22 (1983).
Consequently, in 1946 Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was amended to require the court to make an
"express" determination so that the parties would know which
claims had and had not been disposed of.
In this case, to hold that the Dewsnups1 counterclaim was
"implicitly" disposed of by the summary judgment would put
every claimant in the untenable position of having to appeal
every disposition of any claim in a multiple claim case on the
chance that a court would later hold (as Judge Harding did)
that their claim had been implicitly disposed of and the time
for appeal had run.

This is exactly the problem the 1946
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amendments to Rule 54(b) were designed to eliminate.
In Lamp v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1981), the
Tenth Circuit considered whether a claim could be "implicitly"
disposed of under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,

In that case, the plaintiff had filed

claims

against multiple defendants, and the claims against one
defendant had been dismissed.

The other defendants later

argued that the dismissal had implicitly dismissed the claims
against them as well.

The Tenth Circuit rejected that

argument, stating that Rule 54(b) does not contemplate the
"implicit adjudication" of claims:
First, Rule 54(b) requires an "express
determination" and "express direction" for
entry of a judgment adjudicating fewer than all
the claims of the parties. Any other judgment,
"however designated" will not satisfy Rule 54(b)'s
requirement. Second, the purpose of Rule 54(b)
is to limit ambiguity as to the appealability of
the judgments entered during the course of
litigation involving multiple claims or multiple
parties. To require a reviewing court to consider
the intentions of the district judge, in the face
of and contrary to an explicit judgment, would
not help to further maintain clearly defined rules
of appellate jurisdiction. Rule 54(b), therefore,
does not contemplate "implicit adjudication" of
claims.
Id. at 1169. (Emphasis added).
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
patterned after Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The Utah courts often look to the intent behind

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in interpreting Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure that have been patterned thereafter.
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State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986); Nelson v.
Stoker, 669 P.2d 392-93 (Utah 1983).
To hold that the Dewsnups counterclaim had been
"implicitly" disposed of would create the very problem that
1946 amendment to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was intended to eliminate.

Under Rule 54(b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical to Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Dewsnups1
counterclaim could not have been "implicitly" disposed of by
the summary judgment.
B.

UNDER THE GENERAL RULES GOVERNING THE
INTERPRETATION OF JUDGMENTS, THE DEWSNUPS1
COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT DISPOSED OF BY THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The summary judgment only grants judgment on the claim
made in plaintiffs1 complaint, and never mentions the
counterclaim or any of the issues raised in the counterclaim.
Nevertheless, Judge Harding held that the summary judgment had
"implicitly" disposed of the Dewsnups counterclaim.
That holding is contrary to the general rules governing
the interpretation of judgments.

A judgment is subject to

"construction according to the rules that apply to all written
instruments."

Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586

P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978).

Consequently, where the language

of a judgment is "clear and ambiguous" it will be interpreted
"as it speaks."

Ld.

In this case, it is "clear and

ambiguous" that the summary judgment did not dispose of the
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Dewsnups1 counterclaim because the summary judgment never
purported to adjudicate the Dewsnups1 counterclaim, never even
mentioning the counterclaim or any of the issues raised
therein.
In Redding v. Powell, 452 So.2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), the court held that where the counterclaim was not
"specifically mentioned or referred to" in the summary
judgment on the plaintiffs claim, the counterclaim was not
disposed of:
[W]e hold that summary judgment did not dispose
of appellant's counterclaim because the record
indicates that neither appellee's motion for
summary judgment nor the court's order specifically
mentions or referred to the counterclaim.
Id. at 135.
In this case, neither the motion for summary judgment, the
affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment nor
the summary judgment itself "specifically (or unspecifically)
mention or refer to the counterclaim."
Furthermore, where a document is "clear and unambiguous",
a party cannot "create" an ambiguity through the introduction
of extrinsic evidence.

The ambiguity, if it exists, must be

evident from the instrument itself.

Ron Case Roofing &

Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).

The

fact that an instrument is silent on one particular issue does
not by itself create an ambiguity, rather it is presumed that
the instrument was not intended to address that issue. Hal
Taylor Associates v. Union America, Inc. 657 P.2d 743, 749
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(Utah 1982).

The existence of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim does

not by itself create an ambiguity in the summary judgment.
Rather, the presumption is that the summary judgment was not
intended to address the Dewsnups1 counterclaim.
If the summary judgment is determined to be ambiguous,
"the entire record" may be resorted to for the purpose of
construing the judgment.

Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign

Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978).

In this case, when the

entire record is resorted to the record shows that plaintiffs
did not request summary judgment on the Dewsnups1
counterclaim, and that the plaintiffs' did not mention any of
the issues raised in the Dewsnups1 counterclaim in their
motion for summary judgment or in the affidavit in support
thereof.

Given this, how can the summary judgment (which does

not mention the counterclaim) be construed to have disposed of
the counterclaim when a motion for disposition of the
counterclaim was never made and when neither the counterclaim
nor any of the issues raised in the counterclaim were before
the court?

When the "entire record" is reviewed, it is clear

that the summary judgment did not dispose of the counterclaim.
Finally, a well recognized rule of construction is that a
"document...drawn up by [a party] through their
attorney...should be strictly construed against them."
Guinand v. Walton 450 P.2d 467, 469 (Utah 1969).

In this

case, the summary judgment was drafted by the plaintiffs'
attorney.

Had the plaintiffs thought that the counterclaim
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was disposed of by the summary judgment, surely they would
have so stated in the summary judgment which they drafted.
Plaintiffs should not now be allowed to benefit by arguing
that the summary judgment (which they drafted) is ambiguous
and thus deprive the Dewsnups of their counterclaim.
C.

ANY DISPOSITION OF THE DEWSUPS1 COUNTERCLAIM WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT NOTICE, AND
THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.

Both Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution
provide that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."

The Dewsnups

counterclaim is "property" within the meaning of those
sections.

Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities, 300 P. 1040,

1045, (Utah 1931); 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Section
984 nn. 92-93 (1985).

Consequently, the Dewsnups cannot be

deprived of their counterclaim without due process of law.
Due process requires thcit before a person can be deprived
of their property, they must be given notice of any action
that will deprive them of their property and that notice must
be "reasonably calculated" to "apprise [that person] of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections:"
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. The notice must be
of such nature as reasonably to convey the
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required information and it must afford a
reasonable time for those interested to make
their appearance [Citations omitted].
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court has held that notice of a
hearing must "adequately inform the parties of the specific
issues they must be prepared to meet:"
To satisfy an essential requisite of procedure
due process, a 'hearing1 must be prefaced by
timely notice which adequately informs the
parties of the specific issues they must
prepare to meet. [Citation omitted].
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983).
"Thus, where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a
party of the nature of the proceedings against him or her, a
party is deprived of due process." W. & G. Co. v.
Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 762 (Utah App. 1990).
For example, in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P. 2d 1207, 1213-14
(Utah 1983), the court held that where notice was given for a
"hearing" instead of for a "trial", the notice was inadequate
to satisfy due process and the subsequent trial was invalid.
In this case, no notice at all was given to the Dewsnups
that their counterclaim was to be adjudicated.

Neither the

motion for summary judgment nor the affidavit in support of
the motion for summary judgment mentioned the Dewsnups1
counterclaim.

Similarly, neither the motion for summary nor

the affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment
mentions any of the issues raised in the counterclaim.
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Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment did not "inform
the [Dewsnups] of the specific issues they must prepare to
meet."

Nelson at 1213.

mentioned.

The counterclaim wasn't even

The notice in this case wasn't even "ambiguous or

misleading", it was silent. If a notice is insufficient in
Nelson because it gives notice for a "hearing" rather than a
"trial", then the notice in this case is insufficient where it
gives .no notice at all that the Dewsnups counterclaim was to
be adjudicated.

In Nelson, the court stated that "[t]imely

and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness."
Id. at 1211. In this case, the Dewsnups had no notice and
consequently no opportunity to be heard on their counterclaim.
Consequently, even if the summary judgment did dispose of the
Dewsnups' counterclaim, the adjudication of the counterclaim
must be reversed since it was done in violation of due
process.
D.

ANY DISPOSITION OF THE DEWSNUPS' COUNTERCLAIM WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT NOTICE, AND
THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF RULE 56(c) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that where a motion for summary judgment is filed with the
court, "[t]he motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for hearing."

In this case, neither

plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment nor plaintiffs'
affidavit in support thereof either mention the counterclaim
or mention any of the issues raised in the counterclaim.
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Therefore, any disposition of the counterclaim would have been
without notice to the Dewsnups.
As a general rule, a summary judgment entered without the
notice required by Rule 56(c) is invalid:
Rule 56(c)...provides that a motion for summary
judgment shall be served at least 10 days before
the hearing date....Noncompliance with this time
provision of the rule deprives the court of
authority to grant summary judgment [Citation
omitted].
Dolese v. United States, 541 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1976).
See also, 10

C. Wright, A. Miller and M. Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure, Section 2719, at 6-8 (1983).
In considering the Rule 56(c) notice requirement, the
Utah Supreme Court has held that "substantial compliance" is
sufficient.

Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Co., 508

P.2d 538 (Utah 1973) (holding 9 days notice was in
"substantial compliance" to Rule 56(c)).

Furthermore, the

Utah Supreme Court has held that the Rule 56(c) notice
requirement can be waived where both parties are present.
Walker States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 1019
(Utah 1972); Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply,
407 P.2d 141 (Utah 1965).

Neither of those exceptions apply

in this case since no notice was given at all and neither the
Dewsnups nor their attorney attended the hearing.
When notice is given pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the adequacy of the content of the notice has been
analyzed by the court under the due process analysis reviewed

above.

Seef e.g, Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah

1983).

Consequentlyf a notice given pursuant to Rule

56(c) that is "ambiguous" or "inadequate to inform a party of
the specific issues they must be prepared to meet" fails to
satisfy Rule 56(c) as well as fails to satisfy due process.
For the reasons discussed in the foregoing section, the
plaintiffs did not give the Dewsnups the notice required by
Rule 56(c) that their counterclaim was subject to
adjudication.
Because notice was not given as required under Rule 56(c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Dewsnups1
counterclaim could not have been disposed of by the summary
judgment, even if the summary judgment had expressly disposed
of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim (which it did not). This case
is similar to two cases from other jurisdiction in which the
lower court had expressly disposed of a counterclaim, even
though it was not mentioned in the motion for summary
judgment.

In both cases the appellate court reversed relying

on the fact that the notice required by the applicable rule of
civil procedure had not been given.

In Faussner v. Waver,

432 So.2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1983) the court reversed the
summary judgment as to the counterclaim where the "summary
judgment on the counterclaim was not addressed by any motion
and [therefore] there was no notice to [the counterclaimant]".
Id. at 102.

Similarly, in Production Credit Association

v. Davidson, 444 N.W.2d 339 (N.D. 1989) the court reversed
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the summary judgment as to the counterclaim where "PCA did not
make a motion to dismiss the counterclaim [and] PCA did not
refer to the issues raised in the counterclaim in its motion
for summary judgment, the brief and the affidavit." Id. at
346.
Because the plaintiffs did not give the Dewsnups notice
that their counterclaim was to be before the court on summary
judgment as required by Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, even if the summary judgment did dipose of the
counterclaim, the adjudication of the Dewsnups1 counterclaim
must be reversed since it was done in violation of Rule 56(c).
II
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EITHER
RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE OR CERTIFIED AS FINAL.
A.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY BE RECONSIDERED UNDER
RULE 54(b).

Because the summary judgment did not dispose of all the
claims in this case and because the trial court did not
certify that judgment as "final" pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, under Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure that judgment is "subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties:"
When more than one claim for relief is presented
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one

or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court
that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
all the parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties, and the order or other
form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
When the Court entered the summary judgment, it only ruled on
the plaintiffs' claim, and not on the Dewsnups1 counterclaim.
Furthermore, the court did not certify the summary judgment
as a "final judgment" for purposes of Rule 54(b).
Consequently, under Rule 54(b) the summary judgment is
"subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties."
Because the summary judgment did not dispose of all the
claims in this case and was not certified as "final", the
Dewsnups did not have a right to appeal the summary judgment
when it was entered.

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure only provides a right of appeal from "final
judgments." (formerly Rule 72(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure).
The problem the Dewsnups faced when the summary judgment
was entered was the same problem the appellants faced in

Kennedy v. New Era Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah
1979).

In Kennedy, the trial court granted summary judgment

on several, but not all claims. When an appeal was taken on
the summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court refused to take
jurisdiction since the summary judgment did not dispose of all
the claims and since the summary judgment was "entered by the
trial court without a Rule 54(b) [final judgment]
determination," and therefore it was not a "final judgment."
.Id. at 536.
Therefore, when the Dewsnups filed their motion to either
reconsider and set aside or to certify as final, what they
were requesting was identical to the request made in Salt
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42 (Utah
App. 1988).

In that case, summary judgment was granted

against the plaintiff on some but not all of its claims.
Sixteen months later the plaintiff moved the court to either
reconsider its earlier summary judgment as allowed under Rule
54(b), or to certify its earlier summary judgment as "final
pursuant to Rule 54(b)" so that it could be appealed.
at 43-44.

Id.

In that case, the court chose to certify its

earlier summary judgment as final, and the plaintiff was able
to appeal that summary judgment.

In this case, having held

that the summary judgment "implicitly" disposed of the
counterclaim, and therefore was a final judgment at the time
it was entered, the district court refused to either
reconsider and set aside the summary judgment or to certify it
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as final pursuant to Rule 54(b),

Once this court has held

that the Dewsnups1 counterclaim was not "implicitly" disposed
of, then under Rule 54(b) the summary judgment is "subject to
revision" because it did not dispose of all the claims in this
case and was not certified as final,
B.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED
AND SET ASIDE.

In the spring of 1980, the Dewsnups were in the process
of purchasing the Arrow Land under the Purchase Contract and
had given the plaintiffs a security interest in the Purchase
Contract under the Assignment of Contract.

On June 2, 1980,

the Dewsnups terminated the Purchase Contract by failing to
make the January 2, 1980 payment by June 2, 1980.

The

Purchase Contract provided that if any annual January 2
payment was not made to the escrow agent by June 2 of that
year, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated:
If Buyers default on the payment falling due on
January 2, 1977, or any payment thereafter
falling due, and if such sum or any part thereof
remains in default for a period of five months,
then Buyers shall forfeit any and all right, title
and interest that they otherwise would have in and
to the property covered by this agreement, title
to which has not passed to Buyers at that time,
and this agreement shall terminate.
(Purchase Contract, pp. 5-6).
The escrow instructions instructed the escrow agent to deliver
title to the Arrow Land back to the seller if it had not
received the annual January 2 payment by June 2 of any year:
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Your instructions are to...release to the seller the
warranty deed...if...the Buyers shall default in the
payment of any sum falling due under the agreement and
said sum or any part thereof remains in default for a
period of five months.
(Escrow Instructions, Paragraph 4)
Thus, when the Dewsnups did not make the January 2, 1980
payment by June 2, 1980, the Purchase Contract automatically
terminated, and title to the Arrow Land was automatically
delivered back to the seller.
The Assignment of Contract only required the Dewsnups to
reimburse plaintiffs for payments made by plaintiffs "under
and pursuant to [the Purchase Contract]:"
[The Dewsnups] agree that in the event they are in
default that [plaintiffs] may make the payments
due under and pursuant to [the Purchase Contract]
and will be reimbursed for the same by [the
Dewsnups].
(Assignment of Contract, Paragraph 4).
The plaintiffs' payment of $49,966.21 was made on June 7, 1980
and therefore could not have been made "under or pursuant to
the Purchase Contract" since the Purchased Contract had
terminated five days before that payment was made.
Consequently, the Dewsnups had no contractual obligation under
the Assignment of Contract to reimburse plaintiffs for that
payment.
Even if the Dewsnups were required to reimburse the
plaintiffs for that payment, that payment was not secured by
the Trust Deed.

The Trust Deed only secured the Promissory

Notes and did not secure payments made under the Assignment of
Contract:
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[The] trustor conveys and warrants to trustee
in trust with power of sale, the following
described property...for the purpose of securing
payment of the indebtedness evidence by a
promissory note of even date herewith, in the
principal sums of $33,000; 56,000 and 30,000, made
by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at
the times, in the manner and with interest as thereon
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or
modifications thereof.
(Trust Deed, p. 1)
Under Utah law, a trust deed cannot be foreclosed for a
debt that is not secured by the trust deed.

In First

Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 (Utah 1980) the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
[T]o attempt to foreclose, for example, on the
mortgager's home for debts incurred in operating
a business and which debts are not specifically
covered by the mortgage would be unconscionable
and contrary to public policy.
Id. at 955-56 (citation omitted).
Furthermore, in interpreting whether a trust deed secures a
debt, the trust deed will be "construed most strictly against
its framer."

Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 540

(Utah 1977).

In Shiew, for example, the Utah Supreme Court

held that even though a mortgage purported to secure all
future advances, a future advance was not secured by the
mortgage where the intention that the future advance be
secured by the mortgage was not specifically referenced in the
document under which the future advance was made.
957.

60 9 P.2d at

In this case, neither the Trust Deed nor the Assignment
of Contract even mention that advances made under the
Assignment of Contract are to be secured by the Trust Deed.
Even if there were some mention made, it would be strictly
construed against the plaintiffs, who drafted the loan
documents.

If the court in Shiew holds that a mortgage does

not secure future advances that the mortgage purports to
secure because there is not sufficient intent manifest in the
other documents, clearly the Trust Deed in this case does not
secure advances made under the Assignment of Contract where
none of the documents manifest that intention.

The summary

judgment erroneously foreclosed on the Trust Deed for a debt
that was not valid, and even if valid, was not secured by the
Trust Deed.

Therefore, the summary judgment should either be

set aside or certified as final so that it can be appealed.
Everyone in this case knows that the summary judgment was
wrongfully granted.

In the proceedings below, the plaintiffs

never even tried to justify the summary judgment, but only
argued that procedurally the summary judgment should not be
reconsidered.

The Dewsnups have suffered for many years as a

result of a summary judgment that was wrongfully granted.
time has come to set it aside.

The

If it is not set aside, the

summary judgment should be certified as final so that it can
be appealed.
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Ill
THE DEWSNDPS1 MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COUNTERCLAIM
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
A.

UNTIL JANUARY 6, 1991, THE DEWSNUPS1 WERE BARRED FROM
PROCEEDING ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM.

At the time the Dewsnups filed bankruptcy, the Dewsnups1
counterclaim became part of the "estate" created pursuant to
Section 5 41(c) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. Section 101
et seq.).

Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides

that the bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case."

Commentators have stated that "[i]t is...intended

that all interests of the debtor in rights of action be
included as property of the estate under Section 541(a)(1)."
4 L. Kingr Collier on Bankruptcy,
Ed. 1991)

Section 541.10[1] (15th

(Emphasis in original).

Under Section 323(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, the
bankruptcy trustee is the "representative of the estate," and
is authorized to act on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.
Bankruptcy Rule 6009 provides that "[w]ith or without court
approval, the trustee...may prosecute...any pending action or
proceeding by...the debtor."

Under Section 554 of the

Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy trustee is authorized to
abandon property of the bankruptcy estate that is "burdensome
to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit
to the estate."

Upon abandonment, "the trustee is simply
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divested of control of the property because it is no longer
part of the estate."

4 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy,

Section 554.02[2] (15th Ed, 1991).

Title to a right of action

that has been abandoned "reverts to the debtor and he may then
prosecute if he so desires." Id. Section 541.10[1].
Until the Dewsnups1 counterclaim was abandoned by the
trustee, the Dewsnups could not prosecute the counterclaim.
Had they attempted to prosecute the counterclaim, they would
have experienced the same result as in Benson v. Probst, 366
P.2d 700 (Utah 1961).

In that case, a married couple that had

filed bankruptcy attempted to prosecute a claim on their own
behalf that had not been abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee.
The Utah Supreme Court barred the couple from doing so,
stating that the claim became "an asset in the hands of the
trustee in bankruptcy" and the trustee had "plenary power to
deal with it as an asset and as the trustee and the federal
courts deem proper...."

_Id. at 700.

On January 6, 1991, the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the
Dewsnups1 counterclaim.

Until then, the Dewsnups were unable

to pursue their counterclaim.

After the Dewsnups1

counterclaim has been abandoned, the Dewsnups sought to amend
and pursue their counterclaim.

The court, however, denied

their motion to amend, holding that the counterclaim had been
"implicitly" disposed of by the summary judgment.
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B.

THE DEWSNUPS1 MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COUNTERCLAIM
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a counterclaim may be amended "by leave of the court" and
that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires":
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served orf if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has
not been placed on the trial calendar, he may so
amend if at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that Rule 15 should be
interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their
claims fully adjudicated:
[The Rules of Civil Procedure] must all be looked
to in the light of their even more fundamental
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and
procedure to the end that the parties are afforded
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963).
"[T]he policy of the law is toward liberality in the allowance
of amendments and to regard them favorably in order that the
real controversy between the parties may be presented, their
rights determined, and the cause decided..."

Johnson v.

Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Utah 1936) (Citation
omitted).

The "courts should be liberal in allowing

amendments to the end that cases may be fully and fairly
presented on their merits." Hancock v. Lukey 148 P. 452,
457 (Utah 1915) (Citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court has long held that if
the opposing party has an adequate opportunity to respond to
the amended pleadings, the amendment should be allowed.

In

overruling the trial court's denial of a Rule 15 motion to
amend in Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981), the
Utah Supreme Court stated that leave to amend should have been
granted since the opposing party had "fair opportunity" to
respond to the amended pleading:
A prime consideration in determining whether an
amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of
an opportunity for the opposing party to meet the
newly raised matter.... Some tempest has been raised
about the court allowing the plaintiff to make
tardy amendments to the pleadings.... The pleadings
are never more important than the case that is before
the court.... There can be no prejudice in this case
because we'll give ample time for an answer.... This
is in harmony with what we regard as the correct
policy: of recognizing the desirability of the
pleadings setting forth definitely frame issues, but
also of permitting amendment where the interest of
justice so requires, and the adverse party is given
a fair opportunity to meet it.
Id. at 98 (Citations omitted).
Similarly, in upholding a trial court's granting of leave to
amend in Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963), the Utah
Supreme Court held that "[w]hat [the opposing party is]
entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity
to meet them.

When this is accomplished, that is all that is

required."

_Id. at 91.

The Utah Supreme Court has never upheld a trial court's
refusal to grant leave to amend a pleading before a trial date
has been set, since at that point in the litigation the
opposing party will always have time to respond to the amended
pleading.

(See Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1971)

(where the case had not been set for trial, the trial court
"abused its discretion" in refusing to permit defendant to
amend its answer to add a counterclaim); Detroit Vapor Stove
Co. v. J. C. Weeter Lumber Co., 215 P. 995 (Utah 1923)
(where the case had not been set for trial, it was "error" for
the trial court to refuse to permit an amendment to the
counterclaim); Hancock v. Luke, 148 P. 452 (Utah 1915)
(where case had not been set for trial, it was "error" for the
trial court to refuse to permit an amendment to the answer).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the rule in this
state has always been to allow amendments freely where justice
requires, and especially is this true before trial." Gillman
v. Hansen. 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Utah 1971).

In Gillman,

the court went on to state that one of the purposes of a
pre-trial conference was to "enable the parties to make such
amendments to the pleadings as may be required to present all
issues at trial." JEd. at 1047.
In this case, no trial date has been set and no pretrial
conference has been held with respect to the counterclaim.
The opposing party will have ample opportunity to respond to
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the Dewsnups' Amended Counterclaim.

Under these

circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court has always held that
leave to amend must be granted.
The only time the Utah Supreme Court has upheld a trial
court's refusal to grant leave to amend is where the amendment
was sought shortly before trial or at trial so that the
opposing party did not have adequate time to respond.

See

Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant,
Inc., 470 P.2d 257 (Utah 1970) (upholding trial court's
denial of motion to amend answer at trial); Girard v.
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) (upholding trial court's
denial of motion to amend complaint at trial because of the
"disadvantage" defendants would face trial); Staker v.
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190-91
(Utah 1983) (upholding trial courts denial of motion to amend
answer at trial because amendment would make "the expense of
discovery and preparing for trial" by opposing party "wasteful
and pointless"; Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 663
P.2d 93 (Utah 1983) (upholding trial court's denial of motion
to amend complaint brought several weeks before trial which
would have caused the trial to be postponed); Kelly v. Utah
Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987) (upholding
trial courts denial of motion to amend shortly before trial
because opposing party would have been prejudiced by having an
issue adjudicated for which they did not have time to
prepare).

In this case, the plaintiffs will have ample time
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to respond to the amended counterclaim.
been set.

No trial date has

No pretrial conference has been held.

The

Dewsnups1 Motion to Amend Counterclaim should have been
granted.
CONCLUSION
In 1980, a meritless claim was brought against the
Dewsnups by their own attorney.

Although the claim was

meritless, a court granted summary judgment on that claim when
the attorney that their attorney had recommended represent
them failed to make an appearance on the plaintiffs1 motion
for summary judgment (unbeknownest to the Dewsnups for many
years).
The summary judgment having been granted, the Dewsnups
have spent 10 years in bankruptcy court litigation trying to
save the family farm.

The Dewsnups perservered, knowing they

were in the right and believing that someday, somehow, if they
did not give up justice would prevail.
The summary judgment was wrongfully granted.
this case knows that.

Everyone in

However, the Dewsnups1 former attorney

(and the other plaintiffs) have pursued the Dewsnups through
10 years of bankruptcy litigation trying to enforce it. The
Dewsnups are entitled to justice just like any other citizen,
and the Dewsnups are entitled to be released from the bondage
of this injustice.
The Dewsnups1 counterclaim has never been decided and has
finally been released to them by the bankruptcy trustee.
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The

Dewsnups are entitled to finally have their day in court on
their amended counterclaim, as well as to have the summary
judgment finally set aside.
Based on the foregoing, this court should hold that the
Dewsnups1 counterclaim was not "implicitly" disposed of and
should set aside the summary judgment and grant the Dewsnups
leave to amend their counterclaim.
DATED this j?<[day of July, 1991.

t+MA

C^~~~

RUSS
JSSELL A. CLINE

Attorney for T. LaMar
and Aletha Dewsnup

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that on this gtS-day of July, 1991,
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants
Brief were hand delivered to:
Michael Z. Hayes
Mazuran, Verhaaren & Hayes
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 260
Salt take City, Utah 84106

(Vs***^ ^ t ,
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DEMAND FOR REIMBURSEMENT (Assignment of Contract)

TO:

T. LaMAR and ALETHA DEWSNUP,
Deseret, Utah 84625

You have failed to make the annual payment due under
the terms of the assigned Uniform Real Estate Contract.

You

have also failed to pay the 1979 Property Taxes when due.
Therefore:
Assignees, under the terms of the Assignment of Contract
dated June 1, 1978, by and between T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha
Dewsnup, Assignors, and Trustees of United Precision Machine
and Engineering Company Profit Sharing Plan, ABCO Insurance
Agency, Inc. and Joseph L. Henriod, Trustee for the Annette
Jacob Trust, Assignees, hereby demand that Assignors reimburse
Assignees the amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Nine-Hundred SixtySix Dollars and twenty-one cents ($49,966.21) which sum has
been paid by Assignees as follows: $47,880.50 paid on June 7,
1980, to Valley Bank at Delta, Utah as escrow agent under the
terms of the above-described Contract, and $2,085.71 paid on
June 7, 1980, to the Millard County Treasurer for past due taxes.
Assignees demand that Assignors continue to perform all
of the conditions and obligations requested under the terms
of the Real Estate Contract.
If you fail to comply with this Demand within five (5)
days, legal action will be filed against you for damages, interest and attorney's fees in accordance with the terms of said
Assignment of Contract.
Govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this

/6/t£ day of June, 1980.

ASSIGNESS:

Trustee, United~T?recision Machine
& Engineering Company Profit
Sharing., 'psust

Ttoris'fcee, United Precision Machine
j( Engineering Company Profit
/Sharing Trust

6ML

Trus£ee, UntLted Precision Machine
& Engineering Company Profit
Sharing Trust

A Krehl Smith r President'
ABCO Insurance Agencyf Inc.

^
gpseph L. lienriod, Trustee for
Annette Jacob Trust
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this

day o

tj^y

, 1980, personally

/^Lwunt)

appeared before me

/ who being

by me duly sworn, says that he is the Trustee of United Precision
Machine & Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, the Trust that
executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument
was signed in behalf of said Trust by authority of its Trust
Agreement and said

C%J~LLi*iJ ,^y

/'AATUryU

to me that said Trust executed the same.
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acknowledged

In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and affixed
my seal this /&%. day of

y ^ ^

, 1980.

Notar/ Public
Residing at

,/Wy^

^ y
JW^/yWf.

v

My Commission Expires:
^
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
011

this

/^{T dav of

appeared before me ^AjL)

, 1980, personally

^UILMJLJ

, who being

/LJIUU^ULJL

by me duly sworn, says that he is the Trustee of United Precision
Machine & Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, the Trust that
executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument
was signed in behalf of said Trust by authority of its Trust
Agreement and said

S^fe^J

/luM^o-^iLj

acknowledged

to me that said Trust executed the same.
In witness whereof I have herewith set my had and affixed
my seal this /C^tX. day of

^l~t*»-*--

, 1980.

^ ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Notary/Public
Residing at >^4<£*'2^4*.

^fJ^^'

My Commission Expires:
17^
<, <•
STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this z&^C day of

V ^ ^ {J

appeared before me

, 1980, personally
, who being

by me duly sworn, says that he is the Trustee of United Precision
Machine & Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, the Trust that
executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument
was signed in behalf of said Trust by authority of its Trust
Agreement and said

^^CCL^CL

^

WlUjL^J

to me that said Trust executed the same.
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, acknowledged

In witness whareof I have herewith s e t r?.y hanJl and
my seal t h i s

/Qft

day of

/ ^ ^

.

*ffi.:ad

198 0.

4y jrfw2*/o

Notary Public
•
ary Public
y
Residing
at >&d4Zr

££&*£,

My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this / U> day of

i^c^^c

, 1980, personally

appeared before me A. KreUr Smith, who being by me duly sworn,
says that he is the President of ABCO Insurance Agency, Inc., the
corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and
that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by
authority of its by-laws and said A. Krehl Smith acknowledged to
me that said corporation executed the same.
In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and affixed
my seal this /Q?

day of

(J^zt^^

t 1980.

Notary Publ
Residing at %A

2*£j*r%~

My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this /yO

ss.

day of

'/J-JUL)

1980, personally

appeared before me Joseph/L/ Henriod, who being by me duly sworn,
says that he is the Trustee of Annette Jacob Trust, the Trust that
executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument
was signed in behalf of said Trust by authority of its Trust
Agreement and said Joseph L. Henriod acknowledged to me that said
Trust executed the same.
In witness whereof I have herewith set my hand and affixed
my seal this

/(&

da

Y

of

JLC^tXJ
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, 1980.

Nbtary
Residing
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Disraici court;1
StH 16 1380

WENDELL E. BENNETT
AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
Attornies for Plaintiffs
370 East 500 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7846

r\

J

|p
c,erk

•—

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND,
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees
of United Precision Machine
and Engineering Company Profit
Sharing Trust; ABCO Insurance
Agency, Inc., a Utah Corporation; and, JOSEPH L. HENROID,
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB
TRUST,

^ U M F L i A l N T

Plaintiffs,
vs.
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA
DEWSNUP, ARROW INVESTMENT CO.
a Limited partnership, THE
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF BERKLEY,
IMPERIAL LAND TITLE INC. , as
Trustee and EUGENE L. CARSON and
ELAINE CARSON as Beneficiaries,
STRINGHAM, MAZURAN, LARSEN &
SABIN, a Professional Corporation, MINERAL FERTILIZER CO.,
INC, and HARRY V. KAPS.

C i v i l No.

111/

Defendants.
oooOooo
COMES NOW the plaintiffs above named, and complains of
the defendants, and for cause of action alleges:
1.

That on June 1, 1978, the plaintiff United Precision

Machine and Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust lent to the
defendants the sum of $30,000.00; the plaintiff ABCO Insurance
Agency, Inc. lent to the defendants the sum of $56,000.00; and
Joseph L. Henroid, Trustee of the Annette Jacob Trust lent to the
defendants the sum of $33,000.00, all amounts bearing interest
from that date until paid at the rate of 18% per annum.

Copies of

said promissory notes are attached hereto, and by this reference
made a part hereof.
^ n r\
•> J ,

,
J'

r>

-22. Under the terms of the promissory notes herein before
referred to all accrued interest was to have been paid on June 1,
1979? and the entire balance of interest and principal was to have
been paid on or before June 1, 1980.
3.

The principal sum of $119,000.00 has not been paid,

and interest due on June 1, 1980 in the sum of $21,420.00 has not
been paid, and the entire amount thereof is now due and payable,
plus daily interest on the principal amount at the rate of $58.68
per day.
4.

That in order for the plaintiffs to protect their

security hereinafter referred to it was necessary for them to pay
$47,880.50 to Valley Bank in order to protect the security herein
sued upon, and to also pay to the Millard County Treasurer the sum
of $1,042.85 in order to protect the security herein sued upon due
to the defendants' failure and refusal to make those payments when
due.

The daily interest on the $47,880.50 that the defendants owe

to the plaintiffs is $23.61 per day from the date the payment was
made until the plaintiffs are reimbursed therefore, and the daily
interest on the $1,042.85 paid to the Millard County Treasurer is
$.51 per day from the date of payment until the plaintiffs are
repaid by the defendants.
5.

That the obligation herein sued upon was secured by

a trust deed which is in default, and will be going to trust deed
sale following the expiration of time required by statute under
the trust deed default provisions, with the notice of sale to be
set on or after September 26, 1980.

The properties subject to

trust deed sale are located in Millard County, State of Utah, are
more particularly described as follows, to wit:
BEGINNING 980 Feet West of the Southeast Corner of the
Southwest 1/4 of Section 4, Township 17 South, Range 4
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 1320 feet;
thence West 1264 feet; thence South 625 feet; thence
Southeasterly along the roadway 541 feet; thence South
470 feet; thence East 840 feet to beginning. More or
less 35 Acres.
BEGINNING 980 feet West of the Northeast Corner of the
Northwest 1/4 of Section 9, Township 17 South, Range 4
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence South 1320 feet;
thence West 840 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence
East 840 feet to beginning. More or less 25 Acres.

-3The Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter; of the
Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the Northeast
quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 13, Township
18 South, Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian,
EXCEPTING THEREFROM that portion which lies within the
boundaries Of the DELTA CANAL COMPANY, MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY, ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY and the DESERET
IRRIGATION COMPANY distribution systems.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all rights of way, stock trails,
ditches and canals, gravel pits and gravel beds.
Together with all water rights appurtenant to said
property.
6.

That in addition to the trust deed securing said

loan, the defendants executed an assignment of contract wherein
they assigned their contract of purchase dated November 1, 1976
with Arrow Investment, Ltd. to the plaintiffs, and also gave a
security agreement to the plaintiffs dated June 1, 1978.

The

assignment of contract, marked Exhibit A is attached hereto, and
by this reference is made a part hereof the same as if the entire
assignment of contract and its attachments were set out verbatim
at this point.

The security agreement, marked Exhibit B is

attached hereto, and by this reference made a part hereof as if
the same had been set out verbatim at this point in the complaint.
7.

The properties subject to the assignment of contract

dated November 1, 1976 are located in Millard County, State of
Utah, and are more particularly described as follows, to wit:
Parcel No. 1: That certain farm commonly known as the
Curtis Farm, consisting of 177 acres, more or less, and
described as the SW 1/4 of Section 8, T. 18 S., R. 7 W.,
SLB&M; and beg. at the NW corner of the SE 1/4 of said
Section 8, thence S. 610 feet, then E. 1218 feet, thence
N. 610 feet, and thence W. 1218 feet to the point of
beginning.
Parcel No. 2; That certain farm commonly known as the
Greenwood Farm, consisting of 89.93 acres, more or less,
and described as beginning at the NW corner of Section
18, T. 18 S., R. 7W,, SLB&M, thence E. 2010.5 feet,
thence S. 150.8 feet, thence S. 75° 51'W. 332 feet,
thence S. 30° 59' W. 601 feet, thence southerly to a
point N. 42° 28'E. 133.9 feet from the SE corner of the
SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4, thence S. 42° 28' W. 133.9 feet,
thence westerly to the W. 1/4 corner of said Section 18,
thence northerly to the NW corner of said Section, the
place of beginning.

-4Parcel No. 3: That certain farm commonly known as the
John Baker Farm, consisting of 157.25 acres, more or
less, and described as the E. 1/2 of the N.E. 1/4 and
the E. 1/2 of the S.E. 1/4 of Section 13, T. 18 S., R. 8
W., SLB&M, less a strip 5 1/2 rods wide on the S. side
of the SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 13.
Parcel No. 4: A part of that certain tract known as the
Tamarack Forty, consisting of approximately 25 acres,
more or less, and described as beginning at the SW
corner of the SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 12, T. 18
S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, thence East to the middle or thread
of the Baker Ditch, thence northerly along the middle or
thread of said ditch to the intersection of said ditch
with the Conk Ditch, thence due North to the existing
fence located between said Conk Ditch and the White Top
Ditch, thence easterly along said fence to the Conk
Ditch, thence northeasterly along the middle or thread
of said Conk Ditch to the intersection with the North
Boundary of said SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section
12, thence due West to the West boundary of said SE 1/4
of the SE 1/4 of said Section 12, thence due South to
the point of beginning. In general terms, this tract is
the westerly 25 acres, more or less, of said SE 1/4 of
the SE 1/4 of said section 12.
Parcel'No. 5; A part of that certain tract known as the
White Top Forty, consisting of approximately 30 acres,
more or less, and described as beginning at the SW
corner of the NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 12, T. 18
S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, thence due East to the intersection
with the Conk Ditch, thence northerly along the middle
or thread of said ditch to the North boundary of said NE
1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 12, thence due West to
the West boundary of said NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said
Section 12, thence due South to the point of beginning.
In general terms, this tract is the westerly 30 acres,
more or less, of said NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said
Section 12.
Parcel No. 6: That certain farm commonly known as the
Oley Black Farm, containing 78 acres, more or less, and
described as the E. 1/2 of the N.W. 1/4 of Section 12,
T. 18 S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, less a strip two rods in width
on the E. side of said tract.
8.

That the collateral subject to the security agree-

ment referred to in the foregoing paragraphs consist of the
following:

A water right of 4 days use per month during the grow-

ing season of the Conk Ditch Irrigation Association consisting of
6.66 acre feet per hour between 5:00 a.m. of the 25th and 5:00
a.m. of the 29th of each month and all proceeds of sale for the
disposition thereof.
9.

That the defendant Arrow Investment Company, a

limited partnership, claims a right, title, and interest in and to
the property described in paragraph 7, as contract sellers under
an agreement for the sale of real and personal property dated

-5November 1, 1976, which is the contract that the defendants
Dewsnup assigned to the plaintiffs, and as the contract seller
under said contract their right, title, and interest in and to the
real property described in paragraph 7 will be effected, and
their rights in this matter must, therefore, be adjudicated.
10.

That the defendants Imperial Land Title, Inc., as

trustee, in favor of Eugene L. Carson and Elaine Carson as beneficiaries, and Eugene L. Carson and Elaine Carson individually as
beneficiaries under a trust deed recorded June 12, 1979, as entry
number 28429 in book 134 at page 330-332 of the official records
of the Millard County Recorder's Office are necessary parties to
this action in that they claim a right, title, and interest to the
real property described in paragraph 7, and the court will need to
adjudicate their right, title, and interest in and to the real
property described in paragraph 7 of this complaint, which
interest is inferior and subordinate to the interest of the
plaintiffs, and which should, therefore, be extinguished.
11.

That the defendants Strmgham, Mazuran, Larsen, and

Sabin, a professional corporation has filed a notice of lien for
attorney's fees and legal services against the property described
in paragraph 7, recorded February 25, 1980 as entry number 31183
in book 139 at page 638 of the offical records of the Millard
County Recorder's Office, which lien must be adjudicated and ruled
inferior and subordinate to the interest of the plaintiff in this
action.
12.

That the defendant Mineral Fertilizer Company, Inc. ,

a corporation has filed a judgment obtained in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District in and for the county of Salt Lake
against LaMar Dewsnup in the sum of $8,667.22, plus attorney's
fees, interests and costs, which was filed on August 15, 1978 in
the County Clerk's Office of Millard County, case number 6917,
which judgment lien is inferior and subordinate to the interests
of the plaintiff, and which should be adjudicated as being
inferior and subordinate to the plaintiff's interests herein.

-613.

That the defendant Harry V. Kaps, claims a lien

against the property described in paragraph 7 by reason of a
judgment obtained against LaMar Dewsnup in the District Court of
the Sixth Judicial District in and for the County of Garfield, for
the sum of $12,795,55, plus attorney's fees, interests and costs
that was filed on May 16, 1980 in the County Clerk's Office of
Millard County, case number 7141, which interest of said defendant
Kaps is subordinate and inferior to the interest of the plaintiffs
herein, which interest needs to be adjudicated in this proceeding.
14.

That the defendant, the Federal Land Bank of

Berkley is a necessary party to this action in fact it claims a
right, title, and interest to the real property described in
paragraph 7 by virtue of a mortgage dated December 4, 1974, executed by Richard L. Dewsnup and Barbara W. Dewsnup, his wife, to
secure payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of
$85,000.00 with interest thereon, payable as therein provided,
which was recorded December 19, 1974 as entry number 12241 in book
108 at page 36 of the official records of the Millard County
Recorder's Office, which interest needs to be adjudicated by the
court.
15.

That it will be necessary for the court to adjudi-

cate the respective rights of the plaintiffs and the defendants to
the property claimed by the plaintiffs and the defendants by
reason of contracts, assignments of contracts, trust deeds,
judgment liens, and the like, to order said property sold by
sheriff sale pursuant to Utah law, and to then distribute the
proceeds obtained on the sale to the parties both plaintiff and
defendant claiming any right, title, or interest in and to the
real property described in paragraph 7, and to determine the
respective priorities claimed by all parties to the proceeds, and
determine their standing following the sale of the property
covered under that assigned contract by and between Arrow Investment Company, a limited partnership as seller and Thomas LaMar
Dewsnup and AlLee Aletha J. Dewsnup as buyers, which contract was

-7dated November 1, 1976, and also to that property described in the
security agreement by and between the Dewsnups and the plaintiffs
herein which is dated the 1st day of June, 1978.
That following the sale of the property covered under
the assignment of contract and the security agreement herein
before referred to the amount due and owing the plaintiffs by the
defendants Dewsnup must be determined, and a judgment against them
entered for any unpaid amounts owing to the plaintiffs from the
defendants Dewsnup following the sale of the security herein
referred to, and also the trust deed sale referred to in paragraph
5 of the complaint.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against all defendants determining the respective priority to the property in question
that was given by the defendants Dewsnup to the plaintiffs as
security for the loan of $119,000.00 principal, plus interest,
ordering said property sold, and the proceeds distributed in
accordance with the priorities of the respected parties, determining any deficiency then remaining after both the sheriff's sale
and the trust deed sale, fixing and awarding to the plaintiffs
herein all of their costs of court, legal expenses and attorney's
fees actually incurred, and the entry of a deficiency judgment
against the defendants Dewsnup for any monies left unpaid on their
obligation to the plaintiffs following the disposition of the
security in question in this litigation, and the trust deed sale
referred to in paragraph 5 of this complaint, with interest on all
amounts, and for such other and further relief in accordance with
the agreements and the contracts by and between the parties as
would be just and equitable in the premises, and for all other
relief provided for by law.
DATED this

day of September, 1980.
WENDELL E. BENNETT & ASSOCIATES

Plaintiff's

Address:

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

L^f/^LA

BY
^ATTORNIES FOR PLAINTIFFS
370 E a s t 500 S o u t h , S u i t e 100
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
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WENDELL E. BENNETT
AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
370 East 500 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7846

—
Clerk
m&d^L&lUJh**' Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al.

:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs
vs.
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al.
'Defendants.

:

Civil No. 7191

oooOooo
COMES NCW the plaintiffs above named, and moves the
court, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a
summary judgment against the defendants Dewsnup for the principal
sum of $49,966.21, with interest thereon at either the rate of 10%
or 18%, as the court may determine is due as a matter of law from
June 2, 1980 until paid, and for attorney's fees in an amount in
excess of $5,000.00, which will be testified to by legal counsel
for the plaintiffs at the time of the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment, and for the plaintiffs' costs of court herein
incurred.
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reason
that there are not material issues of fact remaining in this case,
and as a matter of law the defendants Dewsnup are indebted to the
plaintiffs in the sum of $49,966.21 in principal, plus interest,
attorney's fees, and court costs, as a result of their breach of
contract on promissory notes, securred by real property and water
rights.

Since the commencement of this action, the defendants

Dewsnup have paid $147,652.36 in what was believed to be the first
part of a two part settlement, however, they have not paid the

-2remaining $49,966.21 principal, or the interest and attorney's
fees.

The files and records of the court will indicate that the

defendants are in default, and that the amount set out in the
affidavit of Louis L. Timm, attached hereto, and by this reference
made a part hereof, reflect that the defendants have a remaining
balance due and owing the plaintiffs as above set out, and there
are no material issues of fact that dispute that, and the plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment against the
defendants, and each of them in the principal sum of $49,966.21,
plus interest thereon from June 2, 1980 until paid, attorney's
fees incurred, court costs incurred, and for such other and
further relief as the court finds dtfe and owing.
DATED this V ^ ^ a y

of

/ / //^ '^(\ ' ^

, 1981.

WENDELL E. BENNETT & ASSOCIATES

WENDELL E. BENNETT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing on the\Jrio(day

of / / \CL J ^ V V^/, 1981 to Robert C.

Fillerup, 1325 South 800 East^Suite
305, Orem, Utah 84057.
3UX
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WENDELL E. BENNETT
AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
370 East 500 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7846

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al.
Plaintiffs
vs.

:

AFFIDAVIT OF LOUIS L. TIMM

:
:

T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al.
Defendants.

:
:

Civil No. 7191

oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
LOUIS L. TIMM, being first duly sworn deposes and

states:
1.

That he is one of the plaintiffs in the above entit-

led matter, and has personal knowledge as to all of the matters
relative to the pending action, and matters stated in this affidavit.
2.

That on June 1, 1978, the plaintiff United Precision

Machine & Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust lent to the
defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup, the sum of
$30,000.00; the plaintiff ABCO Insurance Agency, Inc. lent to the
defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup the sum of
$56,000.00; and the Annette Jacob Trust lent to the defendants T.
LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup the sum of $33,000.00, all
amounts bearinq interest from that date until paid at the rate of
18% per annum.

Copies of said promissory notes were attached to

the plaintiffs' complaint and are on file with the court.

-23.

Under the terms of the promissory notes herein

referred tor all accrued interest was to have been paid on June 1,
1979; and the entire balance of interest and principal was to have
been paid on or before June lf 1980.
4.

Up to the time of the filing of the complaint in

this action, the principal sum of $119,000.00 had not been paid,
and interest due on June 1, 1980 had not been paid, and the action
was commenced to collect on said obligation owed by the defendants
Dewsnup.
5.

That in order for the plaintiffs to protect their

security interest located in Millard County, State of Utah, which
are described in paragraph 7 of the plaintiffs' complaint, it was
necessary for them to pay $47,880.50 to Valley Bank in order to
protect the* security that is the subject matter of this litigation, and to also pay to the Millard County Treasurer the sum of
$2,085.71 (the sum of $1,042.85 set out in the complaint was an
error, and only constituted approximately 1/2 of the payment made)
in order to protect the security that is the subject matter of
this litigation inasmuch as the defendants Dewsnup had failed and
refused to make payments under the contract that had been assigned
as security in this matter when they were due.

Had that payment

not been made and those taxes paid, the security would have been
totally lost or substantially impaired inasmuch as the contract
seller, a relative of the defendants Dewsnup, could have taken
action to either substantially impair or destroy the security
interest of the plaintiffs herein, by reclaiming the property from
the defendants Dewsnup.

The daily interest on the $47,880.50 that

the defendants owe to the plaintiffs is $23.61 per day from the
date the payment was made until the plaintiffs are reimbursed
therefore, and the daily interest on the $2,085.71 paid to the
Millard County Treasurer is $ilfl* per day from the date of payment
until the plaintiffs are repaid by the defendants.

-36.

That since the commencement of the action, which was

filed simultaneously with a trust deed default procedure, the
defendants Dewsnup have paid, for the purpose of delaying a trust
deed sale on the real property set out in paragraph 5 of the
plaintiffs1 complaint, the sum of $147,652.36.

The defendants

Dewsnup have, however, failed and refused to pay the remainder
owing to the plaintiffs, namely, the principal sums of $47,880.50
that was paid to Valley Bank in Delta, Utah on the assignment of
contract for the Richard Dewsnup/Arrow Investment Property, which
sum was paid on June 2, 1980, and the $2,085.71 for back taxes
paid to the Millard County Treasurer on June 7, 1980.

The total

principal sum of $49,966.21 is, therefore, due and payable to the
plaintiffs by the defendants Dewsnup, plus interest.
*7.

The court's determination will have to be made as to

whether or not the principal sum of $49,966.21 should draw interest at the rate of 18% provided in the note, or 10%, which the
note provides after default, there having been a typographical
error made in the instruments that reduced the note interest from
18% to 10% after default.
8.

Due to the defendant Dewsnup*s default in this

matter, it has been necessary for the plaintiffs to retain legal
counsel for the purpose of having the matter pursued on a legal
basis, and legal expenses have already exceeded the sum of
$5,000.00, and are still accruing, and can be testifed to by our
attornies, Wendell E. Bennett & Associates at the time of the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment for which this affidavit is given in support of.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. ^
DATED this

S / day of

^

£iu( ^ \^

1981.
/ ,

sM.. 1 /"'

LOUIS L. TIMM

<_ •« VV- 1 1

^-

-4SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t hl i s ^ / V d a y

My Commission E x p i r e s

of\Zct^\a^wUL981.

NdTARY PUBLIC R e s i d i n a At

MAILING CERTIFICATE

"

I do hereby cerbify—that I mailed a copy of the f o r e going on the C^4k?(day of / / / [fiflPlK^j

1981 to Robert C.

F i l l e r u p , 1325 South 800 | a s t , Suite 305, Orem, Utah 8405^7.
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DISTRICT COURT
NOV 2 1 1980
MILLARD COUNTY

ROBERT C. FILLERUP
V LM
Attorney for Defendants
I
Oewsnups
1325 South 800 East, Suite 305
Orem, UT 84057
226-0992
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

d^^—^*

—oooOooo—
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al.

;

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

:

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

:

T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al.
Defendants.

:

Civil No.

:

—oooOoooThe defendants T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA DEWSNUP
answer the complaint of the plaintiff as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
2.

Defendants admit paragraphs 1 and 2 of plaintiffs'

3.

In answering paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' complaint,

complaint.

defendants admit that the sum of One Hundred Nineteen Thousand
Dollars ($119,000) has not been paid, and admit that interest
to June 1, 1980, has not been paid, but allege that defendants
tendered the amount of Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred
Twenty Dollars ($31,420) to plaintiffs on June 1, 1980, which
plaintiffs refused to accept.

Further, defendants deny that

interest accrues on the principal amount at the
rate of Fifty-Eight Dollars and Sixty-Eight Cents ($58.68)
per day and affirmatively allege that interest accrues only at
the rate of Thirty-Two Dollars Sixty Cents ($32.60) per day.

4.

Defendants deny paragraph 4 of plaintiffs1 complaint.

5.

In answering paragraph 5 of plaintiffs1 complaint,

defendants admit that the promissory notes sued upon were secured
by a trust deed, but affirmatively allege that said trust
deed includes properties and property descriptions which
were never intended to be included by the defendants.
This defense is more fully set forth in an affirmative
defense hereafter.
6.

In answering paragraph 6 of plaintiffs1 complaint,

defendants admit that an assignment of contract marked
"Exhibit A" was attached to the complaint, and that a security
agreement marked "Exhibit B" was attached to the complaint.
Defendants affirmatively allege that they were induced and
coerced into signing the assignment of contract by Joseph
Henroid, and Earl J. Peck, agents for the plaintiffs, and
that they unknowingly and unwittingly signed said assignment,
and consequently, said assignment of contract is void and of
no effect.
7.

In answering paragraph 7 of plaintiffs1 complaint,

defendnats deny that the assignment of contract is valid and
therefore, deny that the properties listed are subject to
the assignment of contract.
8.

Defendants admit paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,

13, and 14 of plaintiffs' complaint.
9.

In answering paragraph 15 of plaintiffs1

complaint, defendants allege that plaintiffs are not entitled
to foreclose on any property other than the One Hundred
Sixty (160) acres and the Conk Ditch water right, and that
no other property should be ordered sold or foreclosed by
the Court.

-2-

THIRD DEFENSE
10.

By way of affirmative defense, defendants

allege that Joseph L. Henroid, and Earl J. Peck, acting as
agents for both the plaintiffs and the defendants, and while
both were serving as attorneys for the defendants# breached
their fiduciary duties and duties of disclosure to defendants,
and as a result, plaintiffs are estopped from foreclosing on
the trust deed, assignment of contract, and security agreement
as presently written.
FOURTH DEFENSE
11.

As a further affirmative defense, defendants

allege that plaintiffs are estopped from proceeding in this
action'by reason of their election of remedies in foreclosing
upon the trust deed, and this action must be stayed until
such time as the foreclosure of said trust deed is terminated.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintiffs' complaint
be dismissed and defendants be awarded thier costs for
defending this action.
COUNTERCLAIM
For cause of action against the plaintiffs, the
defendants allege as follows:
1.

At all times herein mentioned, Joseph L.

Henroid was an agent of both the plaintiffs and the defendants,
and, as a result, plaintiffs are bound by his conduct.
2.

At all times herein mentioned, Earl J. Peck

was an agent of both the plaintiffs and the defendants, and
as a result, plaintiffs are bound by his conduct.
3.

At the time of the signing of the trust deed,

assignment of contract, and security agreement by defendants
T. LAMAR and ALETHA DEWSNUP, defendants had retained Earl J.
Peck and Joseph Henroid as their attorneys.

-3-

4.

Henroid and Peck failed to fully advise the

defendants of the nature of the transaction involved, failed
to advise defendants that the trust deed included properties
in addition to the One Hundred Sixty (160) acres, failed to
advise defendants that they were assigning the contract of
purchase referred to in plaintiffs' complaint, failed to
advise defendants that they were signing a security agreement,
and finally breached their fiduciary duty to the defendants
in failing to fully disclose the nature of the transaction
involved*
5.

As a result of such failures and breaches of

fiduciary duty, defendants did not learn until June 1980,
that additional property had been included on the trust
deed, and that they had assigned their interest in the
contract of purchase of ARROW INVESTMENT COMPANY, and that
they had signed the secuirty agreement,
6.

By reason of such breaches of fiduciary duty

and failure to disclose by their agents, plaintiffs are
estopped from proceeding with any foreclosure action.
7.

Defendants are entitled to a judgment against

plaintiffs reforming the trust deed to include only the One
Hundred Sixty (160) acres and the Conk Ditch Irrigation
Association water right, and defendants are entitled to a
judgment vacating the assignment of contract and deleting
all other properties from the trust deed.

In addition,

defendants are entitled to a judgment barring plaintiffs
from proceeding on, or otherwise foreclosing on, any other
properties other than the One Hundred Sixty (160) acres and
the Conk Ditch Irrigation Association water right.
8c

By reason of the failure of disclosure and

breach of fiduciary duty of the agents of the plaintiffs,

-4~

defendants are entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee and
costs of this action.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray for judgment against
the plaintiffs as follows:
1.

For a decree reforming the trust deed to

include only the One Hundred Sixty (160) acres and the Conk
Ditch Irrigation Association water right.
2.

For a decree vacating the assignment of contract

Of the ARROW INVESTMENT contract.
3.

For a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of

this action.

.

DATED this jf

day of November, 1980.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
MAILED a true and correct cpy of the foregoing
ANSWER and COUNTERCLAIM to Wendell E. Bennett, Attorney for
Plaintiffs, 370 East 500 South, Suite 100, Salt Lake City,
UT

84111, postage prepaid on this l^T^ay of November,

1980.

Secretary^^

-5-
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EX-OFFICIO CLERK OF THE
DISTRICT COURT

WENDELL E. BENNETT
AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
370 East 500 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7846

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
oooOooo
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al.

:

Plaintiffs,

:

vs.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE

:

T. LAMAR DEWSNUP, et al.

:

Defendants.

Civil No. 7191

:
oooOooo

The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the
defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup having initially
been set for hearing on Tuesday, March 17, 1981, and having been
continued until Tuesday, April 14, 1981, at which time it was
heard by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, and having been supported
by the unrebutted affidavit of Louis L. Timm, and the court being
fully advised in the premises, and the court having examined the
pleadings on file, now makes its
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE AND ORDER OF SALE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That there is now due and owing to the plaintiffs

from the defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup, the
principal sum of $47,880.50, which is accruing interest at the
rate of $23.61 per day from and after June 2, 1980, and the principal sum of $2,085.71, which is accruing interest at the rate of
$1.02 per day from and after June 7, 1980, which accrual of interest shall continue until paid, together with $53.50 for court

-2costs, and $6,985.00 for the costs of collection, including
attorney's fees, and plaintiffs are granted judgment against the
defendants Dewsnup in said amount.
2.

That said sums are secured by the mortgage and

security agreement described in paragraphs 7 and 8 in the plaintiffs' complaint, as well as the trust deed property described in
paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs' complaint, and constitutes a lien
on the secured premises, and water rights, more particularly
described as:
"All of the right, title, and interest of T. LaMar
Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup, owned by them, or to which
they have a right, under that certain agreement for the
sale of real and personal property, by and between the
Arrow Investment Company a limited partnership, as
seller, and Thomas LaMar Dewsnup and Alice Aletha J.
Dewsnup, as buyers, dated November 1, 1976, consisting
of 6 parcels of land, more particularly described as
follows:
Parcel 1: That certain farm commonly known as the
Curtis Farm, consisting of 177 acres, more or less, and
described as the SW 1/4 of Section 8, T. 18 S., R. 7 W.,
SLB&M; and beq. at the NW corner of the SE 1/4 of said
Section 8, thence S. 610 feet, thence E. 1218 feet,
thence N. 610 feet, and thence W. 1218 feet to the point
of beginninq.
Parcel 2: That certain farm commonly known as the
Greenwood i?arm, consisting of 89.93 acres, more or less,
and described as beginning at the NW corner of Section
18, T. 18 S., R. 7 W. SLB&M, thence E. 2010.5 feet,
thence S. 150.8 feet, thence S. 75° 51' W. 332 feet,
thence S. 30° 59* W. 601 feet, thence southerly to a
point N. 4 2° 28' E. 133.9 feet from the SE corner of the
SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4, thence S. 42° 28' W. 133.9 feet,
thence westerly to the W. 1/4 corner of said Section 18,
thence northerly to the NW corner of said Section, the
place of beqinning.
Parcel 3: That certain farm commonly known as the John
Baker Farm, consistinq of 157.25 acres, more or less,
and described as the E. 1/2 of the N.E. 1/4 and the E.
1/2 of the S.E. 1/4 of section 13, T. 18 S., R. 8 W.,
SLB&M, less a strip 5 and 1/2 rods wide on the S. side
of the SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said section 13.
Parcel 4: A part of that certain tract known as the
Tamarack Forty, consisting of approximately 25 acres,
more or less, and described as beqinning at the SW
corner of the SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 12, T. 18
S. R. 8 W., SLB&M, thence east to the middle or thread of
the Baker Ditch, thence northerly along the middle or
thread of said ditch to the intersection of said ditch
with the Conk Ditch, thence due north to the existing
fence located between said Conk Ditch and the White Top
Ditch, thence easterly alonq said fence to the Conk
Ditch, thence northeasterly along the middle or thread

-3of said Conk Ditch to the intersection with the north
boundary of said SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said section
12, thence due west to the west boundary of said SE 1/4
of the SE 1/4 of said section 12, thence due south to
the point of beginning. In general terms, this tract is
the westerly 25 acres, more or less, of said SE 1/4 of
the SE 1/4 of said section 12.
Parcel 5: A part of that certain tract known as the
White Top Forty, consisting of approximately 30 acres
more or less, and described as beginning at the SW
corner of the NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 12, T. 18
S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, thence due east to the intersection
with Conk Ditch, thence northerly along the middle or
thread of said ditch to the north boundary of said NE
1/4 of the SE 1/4 of section 12, thence due west to the
west boundary of said NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said
section 12, thence due south to the point of beginning.
In general terms, this tract is the westerly 30 acres,
more or less, of said NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said
section 12.
Parcel 6: That certain farm commonly known as the Oley
Black Farm, containing 78 acres, more or less, and
described as the E. 1/2 of the N.W. 1/4 of section 12,
T. 18 S., R. 8 W., SLB&M, less a stripe two rods in
width on the E. side of said tract.
and water rights as follows:
570 shares of the capital stock of the Deseret
Irrigation Company, a mutual water company, and;
8 and 1/2 days of Conk Ditch secondary water right,
beqinninq at 5:00 a.m. on the 23rd day of each month
durinq the irrigation season and continuing until 5:00
a.m. on the first day of the following month. This
right is described as 8 and 1/2 days because that is the
average monthly use, although the right consists of 8
days during months with 30 days and 9 days during months
with 31 days. This secondary right is satisfied after
the primary right is satisfied and derives from the
water right alotted and decreed to Joseph B. Dewsnup,
Georqe W. Baker and Noah Rogers as described in the
qeneral adjudication decree of the water rights of the
Sevier River System in that certain case known and identified as Richlands Irrigation Company v. West View
Irrigation Company, civil number 843, in the District
Court in and for the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Utah in and for the County of Millard.
In addition to the real property and water right above
described, the followinq machinery and equipment is also
a part of the security interest beinq foreclosed upon
which was shown as Exhibit A to the contract, and is
more particulary described as follows:
A John Deere Combine; a Foraqe Harvester; a John Deere
Tractor; a Case Tractor; a Minneapolis Moline Tractor
(larqe); a Front End Loader (attached to Case Tractor):
a Calf Table and Two Metal Gates; an International
Harvester Combine; a Case Plow; a John Deere Baler; Two
Hydraulic Chajt Waqons; Two Overhead Tanks {fuel and
water, at Tamarack and Curtis); a Case Swather; a Handcock

-4Scraper; a Land Plane; a Self-Propelled Bale Wagon;
Rough Lumber Stored in Steel Buildings; a Ford Cattle
Truck; a Chevrolet Dump Flat Bed Truck; a leaf Cutter
Bees and Field Stands.
In addition to the foregoing real property, water
rights, and personal property, there is also an additional water right which is subject to the security
agreement, which is also being foreclosed in addition to
the aforementioned real property, water rights, and personal property, more particularly described as follows:
A water right of 4 days use per month during the growing
season of the Conk Ditch Irrigation Association consisting of 6.66 acre feet per hour between 5:00 a.m. of the
25th and 5:00 a.m. of the 29th day of each month and all
proceeds of sale for the disposition thereof.
3.

That said mortgage and collateral subject to the

security agreement set out in the preceding paragraph is hereby
foreclosed and it is ordered that the secured premises, water
rights, and personal property be sold at public auction in the
manner prescribed by statute by the sheriff of Millard County,
subject to the interest of the Federal Land Bank of Berkley,
Imperial Land Title Inc., as trustee and Eugene L. Carson and
Elaine Carson as beneficiaries, Stringham, Mazuran, Larson and
Sabin, a professional corporation, Mineral Fertilizer Company,
Inc., and Harry V. Capps, no determination as to the relative
priorities of any of said persons being established by the court
at this time, and no rights of those persons or associations being
determined by the court at this time, with the buyer of said
property takinq it subject to the respective rights of the persons
herein named.
4.

That said sheriff, after the time allowed by law for

redemption has expired, shall execute a deed to the purchaser or
purchasers at the sale, and if any of the parties to this action
who may be in the possession of the premises, or a part thereof,
or any person who since the commencement of this action shall
refuse to deliver possession of the premises to such purchaser or
purchasers on production of the deed for the premises, water
riqhts, and personal property, or any part thereof, a writ of
restitution may issue, without further notice, to compel such
delivery to the purchaser or purchasers of the respective real
property, waters riqhts, and personal property.

-55.

That the proceeds of the sale shall be applied as

follows, in the following order:

First, to the payment of the

sheriff's fees, disbursements and costs of said sale?

secondly,

to the payment to the plaintiff of the principal sum of $47,880.50,
with interest thereon at the rate of $23.61 per day from and after
June 2, 1980, until paid, and the further principal sum of
$2,085.71, with interest thereon at the rate of $1.02 per day from
and after June 7, 1980, until paid;

thirdly, to the payment to

the plaintiffs of the costs of suit consisting of $53.50, and for
$6,985.00 in collection costs including attorney's fees.
6.

In the event a deficiency shall become due to plain-

tiff after the application of the proceeds aforesaid, the court
retains jurisdiction of this matter for the purpose of determining
the amount of deficiency judgment to be awarded to plaintiff.
7.

That the defendants T. LaMar Dewsnup and Aletha

Dewsnup and all persons claiminq under them, or any of them, after
the filing of the notice of pendancy of this action, be and they
are hereby forever barred and foreclose of all right, title,
interest and equity of redemption in and to the secured premises,
water rights, and personal property, and every party thereof, from
and after the date of the delivery of the deed by the sheriff of
Millard County.
DATED this

^/V

day of April, 1981.
BY THE COUR$

I do hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foreaoino on the /(j&day
of April, 1981 to Robert C. Fillerup, 1325
South 800 East, #305, Orem, Utah 84057.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ ^ L A B D C O U N T Y
Clcrk

~~

OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD 6©»NS¥

IP*

JZL

**********

LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND,
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees
of United Precision Machine and
Engineering Co. Profit Sharing Trust;
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Case Number
-VS-

7191

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA
DEWSNUP, ARROW INVESTMENT CO.
a limited partnership, et al,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

**********

The Court having considered defendants7 motions to
amend counterclaim and reconsider or certify as final hereby
denies such motions.
The Court finds that defendants' claims and their
proposed amended counterclaim where denied in Judge Burn's
judgment* Judge Burns7 judgment foreclosed the mortgage,
acknowledged the existence of the trust deed and ordered the
property sold to satisfy the amount due plaintiffs. It is
implicit in Judge Burn's decision that he denied defendants'
counterclaims because the counterclaims asserted that some of
the property was not to be included in the amended trust
deed; however, Judge Burns rejected that argument, granted
judgment for the entire amount due plaintiffs and ordered the
property to be sold. Because of this the Court finds that the
judgment of Judge Burns was not interlocutory.

Dc?ut>

This Court can not certify the above matter as final
for appeal at this time when the matter was final over ten
years ago.
In regards to the defendants' motion to reconsider,
the Court notes that no such motion exists under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d
978 (1981), Peav v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841 (1980).
Counsel for plaintiffs to prepare an order consistent
with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the
court for signature.
Dated this 21st day of February, 1991.

cc:

Michael Z. Hayes, Esq.
Russel A. Cline, Esq.
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MICHAEL Z. HAYES ( 1 4 3 2 )
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES P . C .
2180 S o u t h 1300 E a s t , #260
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84106
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 484-6161

A EX-OFFICIO CLERK OF THE
DISTRICT COURT

MILLARD COUNTY
-

•Srz. .

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN
NEIUWLAND and FLOYD M.
CHILDS, Trustees of United
Precision Machine and
Engineering Co. Profit
Sharing Trust, et al.,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
DEWSNUPS MOTIONS TO AMEND
COUNTERCLAIM, RECONSIDER OR
CERTIFY AS FINAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and
ALETHA DEWSNUP, ARROW
INVESTMENT CO., a limited
partnership, et al.,

Case No. 7191
Ray M. Harding, Judge

Defendants.
The Court having considered Defendants' Motions to
Amend Counterclaim and Reconsider or Certify as Final and
having reviewed the file and the Memoranda in support of and
opposing said motions and having entered its Memorandum
Decision now makes the following findings and conclusions:
1.

It is implicit in Judge Burn's Judgment foreclosing

the trust deed that Judge Burns denied defendants'
counterclaims.
2.

Judge Burn's Judgment was a final judgment on the

merits of the case which ordered the trust deed on the

Clerk

Deputy

property foreclosedf acknowledge the existence of the trust
deed and ordered the property sold to satisfy the amount due
plaintiffs.
3.

The Court finds that Judge Burnfs Judgment was not

interlocutory in nature and was a final appealable judgment
some ten years ago.
4.

In regards to Defendants Motion to Reconsider the

Court finds that no such Motion exists under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Defendants Motions to Amend Counterclaim and
Reconsider or Certify as Final are denied with prejudice.
DATED this //

day of March, 1991.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

{U^<^i A* &£>*
RUSSELL A. CLINE

